Modern Western society assumes that nonhuman animals do not possess an episteme comparable to humans; this presumption is used to exclude nonhuman species from knowledge-making and practices that intimately affect animal lives. For example, conservation policy that appropriates wildlife lands and reshapes animal societies through deportation (translocation) and genocide (culls and harvesting) is imposed without animal consent or consultation. Now, however, science has eliminated the conceptual foundation that sanctions modern humanity's monopoly on epistemic authority. By illustrating trans-species science in the making, ape-human participatory action research (PAR) at the Great Ape Trust, Iowa, dispels the myth that language and science are the unique property and privilege of Homo sapiens. This and other scientific research reveals animal objectification as a purely political strategy to maintain modern human hegemony. To refute the error of anthropocentrism, ecocriticism needs to consider current scientific work on animal agency and embrace new modes of communication and models of knowledge that bring other species into dialogue and authority as equal partners.
F r dd t n l nf r t n b t th rt l
Introduction Anatole France's novel Penguin Island tells the story of a missionary who, because of his diminished vision, mistakes a colony of great auks for pagan humans. In his confusion, the priest baptizes the birds. 1 This satirical tale has become one of West's most celebrated caricatures of human folly. The book's humor relies chiefly on the absurdity of mistaking a bird for a human to the extent of extending sacred privilege to another species.
Yet, today, in light of what science has faithfully collated during the intervening decades, France's tale does not carry the same sense of the absurd; indeed, if the novel was contemporary, it would not likely find an audience as receptive as France's fin-de-siècle readers. Times have changed; wildlife is regarded differently both because of science's own epistemic evolution as well as that of the planet. Numerous species, most recently the Yangtze River dolphin and Madagascar Alaotra grebe, have become extinct, and thousands of others are moving toward a similar fate.
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Even by the time Penguin Island was published, the great auk had been gone for a half century.
The once seemingly immutable line drawn demarcating humans from other species has faded to near obscurity. Disciplines as diverse as neurosciences, ethnology, psychology, philosophy, and critical studies concur: similarities between humans and other animals far outweigh differences. 3 Researchers even posit that the roots of human religion and spirituality can be found in animal societies. 4 Standards and measures of Western science-the episteme and culture that have been chief architects of animal objectification-have placed us in a position not much different than that of the missionary: namely, uncertain as to who really is "us" and who is the "other." 5 Still, proponents of human uniqueness shrilly assert that the language barrier has yet to be overcome. They argue that while the same structures and processes of the brain governing cognition, affect, a sense of self, morality, and consciousness may be common to both humans and nonhuman animals, language, after all, is core to human culture and minds. What we say and how we say it is the defining medium for human self-expression and existential affirmation. . . . Or is it?
In the quiet of Des Moines, Iowa, U.S.A., the language barrier has been overcome. For over thirty years, Dr. Sue Savage-Rumbaugh (Homo sapiens) has researched nonhuman primate culture and language through a system of lexigrams, spoken English, and bonobo (Pan paniscus) vocalizations. On the surface, this research appears largely to provide insights into the origins of human language. Because of evolutionarily proximity to humans, other apes are regarded as perfect subjects to investigate and why Homo sapiens developed the ability and inclination to "acquire symbols, comprehend spoken words, decode simple syntactical structures, learn concepts of number and quantity, and perform complex perceptual-motor tasks." However, by conforming to scientific standards and protocols, Savage-Rumbaugh and her bonobo collaborators do something far grander: they have cultivated meaning together across species lines, exchanging ideas, thoughts, feelings, and wishes. They commune and communicate in a common language, and in so doing, create trans-species community whose members are distinguished more by individual than species differences. This Pan-Homo community dispels the myth that humans alone have the capacity for language and possess valuable knowledge.
Languaged nonhuman apes have unquestionably transformed the perception of "animal" from object to agent, fully capable of functioning on an equal (if not ethically superior) footing with humans in the creation of culture and epistemic authority. This admission effects a final reversal of one of the "paradigmatic shifts and lurches occasioned by the Industrial Revolution [that] . . . redefin [ed] . . . nature from participative subject and organism in an organic community to the status of pure object." 7 Indeed, while ecocriticism seeks to bring literary and ecological discourse together to bear on anthropocentrism and speciesism much as it has with misogyny and racism, 8 the Pan-Homo experience provokes deeper inquiry into the relationship between letters and speciesism. Notably, while bonobos are able to speak, use lexigrams, and answer questions, they are unable to write. Their knowledge and authority is not diminished, but their agency is, unless human society is willing to change its relationship to speech and the written word. Unless we are willing to admit that wisdom and consciousness equal to or greater than our own are possessed by other species, as our own episteme of science reveals, then efforts to resolve the current social and ecological crisis will suffer. For ecocriticism to function as a political intervention in this crisis, in the error of anthropocentrism, 9 it should include current scientific work on animal agency and new modes of communication and models of knowledge.
The Bicultural Pan-Homo Community
In 2007, the Pan-Homo community achieved a singular success: the collaborative work of a human and three bonobos was published in the Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science (JAAWS).
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The article's singular nature derives from more than content: it was coauthored by Savage-Rumbaugh and bonobos from the Pan-Homo community, Kanzi Wamba, Panbanisha Wamba, and Nyota Wamba. The purpose of the study and article is to describe what apes living in the Des Moines facility considered important for their psychological and physical wellbeing in captivity ( fig. 1 ).
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The title of this unprecedented publication, "Welfare of Apes in Captive Environments: Comments on, and by, a Specific Group of Apes," retains a sense of ambiguity. In the vernacular, "ape" describes gorillas, chimpanzees, and their nonhuman cousins; but more strictly speaking, it is a term that includes humans. However, closer examination of the authors reveals that species distinctions both breakdown and fail to capture significant differences among individuals. While the members, including Homo sapiens Rumbaugh, "have all grown up in a bicultural group consisting of humans and bonobos of varied ages and sexes . . . [who] have acquired human language . . . and who tangibly live in a cultural setting encompassing all age/sex classes," there are important, individual differences.
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"Bicultural" implies competency in two cultures-here, bonobo and human. group. For example, Matata (see below), Kanzi, and Nyota belong genetically and morphologically to the same species, but they have distinct histories and childhood experiences. Unlike their wild counterparts who have been reared in a shared complex of interactions and experiences, the Pan-Homo members have come together by force of circumstances. Matata was wild-born in 1970 and brought with four other bonobos to the Yerkes National Primate Research Center in Atlanta, after having lived in bonobo society in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) until age 5. Two of Matata's children born into captivity were taken away from her and reside in zoos. Her son Akili is now age 30 and living in the San Diego Zoo, and one of her daughters, AnaNeema, is 18 and living in the Milwuakee Zoo. Matata took Kanzi as her own a few hours after his birth; she is his adoptive mother.
14 Kanzi was born to two bonobos, Lorel (now age 41 and living in the Jacksonville [Florida] Zoo), and Bosandjo, in captivity at Yerkes. Kanzi attended over 30,000 "language trials" with Matata. Such early exposure to English and lexigram lessons are considered to be, at least in part, responsible for his linguistics talents. Nyota is Matata's grandson, the progeny of Matata's daughter Panbanisha. Matata, Panbanisha, Kanzi, and Nyota are all bicultural by definition, but in different degrees and ways. In contrast to Kanzi-a "first-generation" bicultural bonobo-and Matata, who is wild-born, Nyota is a "second generation" bonobo reared in a bicultural environment.
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In theory, in a bicultural setting marked by two sets of culturally normative psychologies, behaviors, and languages, an individual's sense of self and competence will reflect both contexts. However, because Matata, Kanzi, and Nyota each came to bicultural living in different ways, we would expect that each has his/her own "brand" of biculturalism. Matata spent her formative years learning freeranging bonobo language and culture and came to human, captive living as someone who was shaped by and identified with her species culture of origin. This particular cultural upbringing is expressed in multiple ways. For example, Savage-Rumbaugh observes that there are some concepts that captive-born Kanzi does not share with his adoptive-mother Matata, because they do not have meaning in her cultural world. The sentence "No, you cannot use that ball, it is Kanzi's" may have meaning and use in captive-born Pan culture, but not for immigrant bonobo society where an individualized "I" is absorbed into an inclusive "we." Matata's "I," cultivated in the free-ranging bonobo troop of the Congo, is not the same as one honed by modernity's dualist traditions. When Matata speaks, she speaks of "we," demonstrating a concept of the self that is reflective of collective, interdependent societies that one finds in freeranging bonobo groups, in contrast to the individualistic, independent, "I"-centered culture of modern, Western humans.
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Similarly and related, neither is Matata's sense self identical to that of Kanzi or Nyota, whose minds developed straddling bonobo and human cultures of varying degrees of biculturalism. 17 Kanzi, while raised by Matata, was immersed in a Pan-Homo environment. He learned Pan-Homo language and customs by being reared by an immigrant bonobo, while ensconced in the customs and language of English, lexigram-speaking humans, and languaged bonobos, some of whom were born in captivity. Nyota's brand of biculturalism is yet different from both Matata's and Kanzi's. His mother Panbanisha was born in captivity; unlike Panbanisha, who was raised by a mother who came from "the old country (Matata),"
Nyota was raised by a mother who had been born into a captive setting. We may consider Kanzi and Nyota similar to Japanese nisei and sansei generations, respectively.
These differences are not superficial. As several lines of neuropsychological research document, different developmental contexts correlate with different social psychologies and underlying neural substrates.
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Because mammalians' and altricial birds' neuropsychological development is highly sensitive to experience and reflective of environmental input and change, variations in developmental contexts will have an effect on a child's evolving neuroendocrinal pathways; early development is a, if not the, formative process that shapes individual psychophysiology and sense of self. The individuating self is defined by an attendant interdependency and ethical contract that distinguishes individuation from individuality-an individuality that varies with culture. 19 Subsequently, cultural context and attachment styles sculpt self-identity and explain cross-generational differences in behavior, social psychology, and identity, as observed in the Pan-Homo community.
The inspiring result of this research is that bicultural rearing is producing cross-generational epigenetic effects upon the bonobos and the humans at a very rapid rate. 20 Both species are co-evolving toward a new kind of understanding of each other with the experience of small biological changes. There is arising enlightened insights and a greatly increased ability to communicate across the species boundary in each succeeding generation. Both species are benefiting, with each beginning to draw upon the best traits of the other in succeeding generations. These changes are not occurring through sexual transmission, but rather through cultural transmission. We believe this to be through epigenetic markers, as well as "learning." Thus a new window is opening into the nature of the process of change across time. In a simple schema, the sense of self and psychology of the members of the Pan-Homo community fall along a bicultural continuum. 22 Each individual is technically bicultural-namely, each is competent in both bonobo and human cultures, though in slightly different ways. To unschooled human eyes, individual bonobos may look the same on the outside, yet underneath, and in action and habit, there are nuanced social psychological differences derived from distinct developmental experiences. Subsequently, the answer to the question "who are these apes?" lies less in the realm of species classifications than with the individual. The genetic human who has spent more than half her/his lifetime with bonobos, and bonobos who have spent most or all of their lives with humans, may have more in common with each other than they do with their in situ (literally, "on-site") conspecific counterparts who live in their country of origin. Brain, behavior, and psyche show that culture, language, and identity extend beyond the discrete boxes of "human" and "bonobo." Given this perspective of animal identity, we are challenged to ask that if the "other" is now "us," then who are "we"?
A group's language embodies the unconscious background of common understanding on which the rest of the culture rides. This unconscious background is the unspoken and unencoded way of being human, of creating meaning, and of signaling intention that allows information to flow among accepted members of the group. In the Pan-Homo community, language and mind fly across borders and we discover that "language and personhood are simply not coincident with the human form." 23 Nonetheless, despite shared language, do the bonobos qualify for scientific authorship of a written, human-languaged journal? Do they qualify as epistemic equals?
Current Authorship Criteria and Meaning
Authorship is an ongoing debate within the academy. Beyond the obvious impulse to achieve individual recognition and acclaim, authorship is also tied to concrete monetary gain. Tenure, research funding, and awards all depend on what has been published and by whom. Authorship is no minor issue to academia. The lengths to which scholars will go for authorship is best exemplified by Maurice Maeterlinck, who plagiarized the work of Eugè ne Marais. The issue of authorship is considered a fairly recent and historically localized phenomenon. Western intellectual-property law and literary theory co-evolved during the eighteenth century. Coincident with other social, economic, and political trends, credit for creation increasingly focused on and privileged the individual. As science became harnessed to the political and economic market, so did the fortune and interests of individual researchers and scholars. Today, authorship is literally "the currency of modern science and a measure of a scientist's participation in the international community." 25 As a result of the post-World War II corporatization of science, 26 authorship has become even more contentious and commoditized. In 1930, the average number of authors on a scientific paper was 1.3, compared to six in 1989. 27 Since then, the numbers have exploded to the point of prompting various alarmed governing bodies to reissue formal criteria for legitimate authorship. For example: "Authorship credit should be based on 1) substantial contributions to conception and design [of the project], or acquisition of data, or analysis and interpretation of data; 2) drafting the article or revising it critically for important intellectual content; and 3) final approval of the version to be published. Authors should meet conditions 1, 2, and 3." 28 Others maintain that authorship needs to accommodate the changes that science has undergone, from the single endeavor to a more collaborative effort. This is particularly true in the biomedical sciences, where a diversity of resources and partners are required to accomplish the research. The Quantitative Uniform Authorship Declaration (QUAD) share of the total credit" in each of the following four categories: conception and design of the project; data collection; data analysis and conclusions; and manuscript. The least an author can contribute to a paper would be 10 percent within a single category, and authors would be listed in descending order of their total contribution across all four categories. Even more broadly, a survey conducted to assess publishing and authorship standards in academic journals (e.g., those of the National Institutes of Health, National Academy of Science, and American Physical Society) shows that a person legitimately qualifies for authorship if she or he has "made significant contributions," owns "a stake in the product," and/or "made [a] substantive creative contribution to the generation of an intellectual product." 
Pan-Homo Authorship
Savage-Rumbaugh's publications demonstrate that Pan-Homo bonobos are able to comprehend and communicate at levels required for conducting research by scientific standards. The bonobo researchers communicate with human beings with sufficient sophistication to convey their "own views regarding their welfare." The Pan-Homo bonobos have unique communicative abilities in "that three of them are able to comprehend and respond to complex linguistic narration and questioning in a free-flowing manner on essentially any topic connected meaningfully to their lives. It is thus possible to ask for, and receive, their feedback on many aspects of their environment, whether social, physical, psychological, or cultural." 31 The topic of the research and article is ape welfare-specifically, the wellbeing of the co-authors themselves, a subject about which they have clear knowledge and authority. The bonobos also have a "stake" in the product: without their participation, there would be no data, no source of information from which to base the study, and no manuscript. Consequently, the bonobos fulfill authorship criteria set by U.S. science institutions. In keeping with publishing standards, the JAAWS's article author-order was based on levels of contribution and seniority. If, as Savage-Rumbaugh points out, "the participation of human beings had been equal to that of the bonobos, Arguments objecting to mixed-species authorship ring hollow when evaluated scientifically and from the perspective of political history. Scientific theory, data, and standards confirm bonobos' capacity to function in the role as colleagues. A glance at history illustrates that Western colonial cultures have denied other indigenes' voices; other societies have been silenced by a prejudiced collective. Liberation psychologist Ignatio Martín-Baró maintained that to serve the minds and hearts of people, it is necessary to understand them from their own points of view, not from an enforced group standard. It is necessary, he argued, for researchers "to redesign our theoretical and practical tools . . . from the standpoint of the lives of [these] people: from their sufferings, their aspirations, and their struggles." 33 Savage-Rumbaugh puts this view into practice by insisting that creating conditions to meet the needs of bonobos requires expertise not from an enforced group standard (human), but from the people themselves (bonobos): "Why rely solely on the judgments of human beings when one can ask the apes for their own opinions? . . . The bonobos have contributed directly, through conversation, to important aspects of this work. Their listing as authors is not a literary technique but a recognition of their direct verbal input to the article. They are not able to write, but they are able to speak, to use lexigrams, and to answer questions." 34 Through this process, the Pan-Homo bonobos were not only able to provide input, but to critique study results and inferred conclusions: they were able to "defend" and explain results. The bonobos were capable of verbal "review [of] all drafts of manuscripts for accuracy/fidelity and . . . indicate agreement [or dissent] before a draft is moved forward to publication." 35 As senior author, Savage-Rumbaugh consulted with her co-authors before, during, and after the process.
The bonobos' active participation is evident in one of the study's most critical findings: the items they need for healthful and respect- ful life in captivity (see table 1 ). 36 Savage-Rumbaugh began the study by listing "the things I have come to believe are important to these bonobos and to solicit their views regarding my thoughts. After I formulated a list of the items that I believed have been paramount to their self-actualization, I presented my ideas, in simpler terms, to Kanzi, Panbanisha, and Nyota to determine if they agreed." 37 While there was considerable agreement between Savage-Rumbaugh and her co-authors on welfare criteria, there were also differences; not all of the human researcher's suggestions were "met with agreement":
Although it is true that I chose the items listed as critical to the welfare of these bonobos and facilitated the discussion of these particular items, I did not create this list arbitrarily. These items represent a distillation of the things that these bonobos have requested repeatedly during my decades of research with them. When I meet these requests, as best I can, new and unexpected competencies emerge in this group; many still are not documented in sufficient detail. 38 Notably, the method used in the study was Participatory Action Research (PAR), where study objectives, process, and outcome are designed to be informed by and benefit all participants. 39 PAR's transparency and lack of epistemic hierarchy in the research process creates a dynamic of co-participation and shared authority. Its purpose, therefore, is to make explicit what is usually implicit and often denied: the influence of the researchers' own projections and bias. In this instance, a PAR approach was used to engage and investigate the bicultural experience of the Pan-Homo community to determine what the bonobos considered essential to their welfare. Instead of the conventional animals-as-object framing, the Pan-Homo community participated simultaneously as objects and subjects. The resultant publication represented research findings in English to communicate to a broad readership of scientists and policy makers, who do not know bonobo or Pan-Homo lexigram English. In summary, then, the study proves that the bonobos' scholarship meets standards required for human work. As published authors in a peer-review journal, the bonobos are now officially members of science academy. 40 
Implications of Trans-species Authorship
Undoubtedly, the Pan-Homo researchers have brought the academic community to an uncomfortable edge. While some scientists and ecocritics have argued diverse perspectives concerning the status of other animals, 41 science has, for the most part unwittingly, discovered a unitary model of brain, behavior, and mind that includes all vertebrates (and evidence for invertebrates is not far behind). Nature is no longer a silent "other" against which human identity and meaning can be argued. Instead, Nature stares back-agentic, and with epistemic authority challenging modernity to answer for itself. What debate remains is explicitly political, a matter of modern humanity's willingness or unwillingness to relinquish its selfproclaimed power and privilege over other species. If, as science demonstrates, the human-animal difference is not greater than animal-animal differences, then ethical and legal standing must follow, as insisted by the cultural and legal precepts with which science is partnered. Arguments for human personhood based on science hold for bonobo, elephant, cat, tortoise, goldfish, or any other animal. Ethical arguments no longer logically fall along species lines, but become philosophical and political discussions for life as a whole. This has implications beyond animal rights.
For example, the current realm of sustainable futures and environmental policy is largely determined by Western human values and vision, where proposed solutions generally exclude the conservation of traditional, indigenous human and animal cultures. 42 Nonhuman animals and their indigene human neighbors have been denied participation in shaping policies that affect their lives. Recognition of human-animal mental and moral continuity, now including language, deconstructs this hierarchical imperative by directly links questions of wildlife disenfranchisement and the present socio-ecological crisis to the agenda of a specific human culture and agenda. Real sustainability must be rooted in the status of animal self-determination; achieving sustainability involves all of us living like animals, with shared trans-species language, values, and meaning. Similarly, wildlife conservation must be transformed from a project of species preservation to one of social justice and selfdetermination, where epistemic authority and decision-making may not only be shared with other species, but dictated by nonhuman species.
We stand at an existential and epistemic crossroad. Many ecocritics and like-minded scientists have called for human knowledge to become accountable to the world, for greater social and ecological impact. 43 If indeed we possess a keen moral sensibility, an obligation to answer for our actions and inactions, then knowledge of humananimal comparability compels an ethical reconfiguration to match this knowledge. The Cartesian world of "constructed time, linear cause-effect thought, moral judgment, criticism, episodic memory, and mental time travel" 44 ceases to be de facto normative. In the now-leveled epistemic playing field, we are compelled to find other models of living among animal kin that will not perpetuate the social and ecological holocausts destroying the planet today.
New relational modes of knowledge, based on felt existence and experience, suggest that consciousness is not produced by the machinery inside our heads, but rather through the matrix of relationships in which we are immersed. 45 The Pan-Homo project suggests that the "null" or "natural" state of community exists in species intersections, in the psychological borderlands 46 characteristic of many traditional, subsistence, indigenous peoples. 47 Primatologist Barbara Smuts 48 and others 49 suggest expanded "ways of commu-
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Configurations nicating that can be described as embodied, creative, co-regulated, mutually contingent" to replace the Cartesian paradigm, where the self is bifurcated into a "doer and a viewer," thereby imposing a perceptual and political dichotomy. The Pan-Homo community illustrates how to move from a separatist world based on Cartesian theory back to lived experience and a path toward human and nonhuman indigene recovery and survival. The time is now to put this knowledge into action. Having an environment that is not harmful to health or well-being 2. Being able to travel from place to place The right to freedom of movement 3. Going to places they have never been before
The right to leave the state, to enter, to remain in, and to reside anywhere in the state 4. Planning ways of maximizing travel and resource procurement
Every citizen has the right to a passport 5. Being able to leave and rejoin the group, to explore, and to share information regarding distant locations
The right to form, join, and maintain cultural, religious, and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society. The right to access of information 6. Being able to be apart from others for periods of time Persons belonging to a cultural, religious, or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other members of that community, to enjoy their culture or be denied the ability to practice their religion and use their language, to form, join, and maintain cultural, religious, and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society 7. Maintaining lifelong contact with individuals whom they love
Having their environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations 8. Transmitting their cultural knowledge to their offspring
The right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice, and to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice. Persons belonging to a cultural, religious, or linguistic community may not be denied the right to enjoy their culture, practice their religion, and use their language 9. Developing and fulfilling a unique role within the social group
The right of freedom of expression 10. Experiencing the judgment of their peers regarding their capacity to fulfill their roles, for the good of the group
The right to choose their trade, occupation, or profession freely 11. Living free from the fear of human beings attacking them
The right to freedom and security of the person, and to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources 12. Receiving recognition from the humans who keep them in captivity of their level of linguistic competency and ability to self-determine and self-express through language
Everyone has inherent dignity, and has the right to have their dignity respected and protected 
